

Managing Rangelands under Uncertainties

Applying Bio-Economic Models and Trust Games for Rangeland Management and Conservation under Uncertainty

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
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Rangeland Management and Biodiversity





Degradation and biodiversity loss in rangelands




- Bush encroachment
- Desertification
- Vegetation clearing



Land use, managers and study sites



Managing rangelands under uncertainties



ERRATIC AND LOW RAINFALLS

(CV=0.6)

Determining rangeland condition and income

HIGH PRICES VARIABILITY

due to limited markets and market accessibility

TRUST and COOPERATION

essential for functional rangeland management local institutions



Ecology and economics: modeling approach (South Namibia)

Anthropology and behavioral economics: field experiments (Namibia and South Africa)


- Which role do these uncertainties play in the adequate management of biodiversity and rangeland resources among farmers ?
- How can they be managed or reduced in order to enhance good rangeland management and conservation?



Modeling decision making under uncertainty



Transition Probabilities Vegetation model
-> impact of grazing on Rangeland condition



Mathematical programming model

- **Dynamic** optimization over 30 years (*indicative* – not predictive)
- **Bio-economic**
- **Recursive (uncertainty)** with expectations for prices and rainfall



Parametrization: farm data (2005-2006) and literature



Price stochasticity and price expectations



- Stochasticity of prices determines herd composition and diversification

⇒ Price stability is a major driver for dorper adoption



Rainfall expectations and ecological consequences

Karakul preferred when dry years are expected



- Light sheep such as Karkaul and Damara seem optimal in precautionary approaches (lower rainfall)

• Precautionary attitude has the highest E-E payoff

• Expectations over rainfall have the highest impact on rangeland conservation

Domptail & al. in prep.



Uncertainty in cooperation for rangeland management



B. Vollan



M. Pröpper



S. Prediger

- How to measure trust as a pre-condition for cooperation?
- How to evaluate the impact of rules on the success of cooperation?



Uncertainty in cooperation for rangeland management: Trust game methodology



B. Vollan

Groep A			Groep B		
hou	gee	$\times 3$	kru	hou	
8	8	$8+3$	24	$24+8=32$	
6	6	$6+3$	18	$18+8=26$	
4	4	$4+3$	12	$12+8=20$	
2	2	$2+3$	6	$6+8=14$	
0	0	$0+3$	0	$0+8=8$	

B. Vollan

Rules: Players A and B both receive 8R each. Players do not directly interact, rather they decide anonymously.

A – the ‘Truster’ - can give a share of that sum – if he thinks that he can trust an unknown B...

That share will be tripled on the way to be (e.g. A gives 3N\$ then B receives 12R)


B – the trustee - can reciprocate A's move by sharing and sending money back to A.

- Game reveals the trust levels related to the **social history** of the community

1 USD = 8 Rand



Uncertainty in cooperation : trust game results



- Overall trust levels are low: 'small scale reciprocity'

- Trust in communities of Namaqualand is outstandingly limited

=> Limits the potential for cooperation

- Role of education:
One additional year of schooling raises the amount sent by 13%

Mann-Whitney test South-Africa/Namibia: $Z=3.43$; $p<0.1$

Vollan & al. 2007
Pröpper, 2008



Uncertainty in cooperation for rangeland management: The grazing game

Rules- Players choose among two grazing areas [A or B]
Choose the intensity for farming [0, 1, 2]
Dependent on the condition [good, bad]
people get payoffs according to payoff matrix
10 rounds of decision making

Characteristics

- non-linearity in ecological dynamic

- The game reveals the **internalized norms for resource management** of the community

Uitbetalings Tabel

	Weiveld A		Weiveld B	
	Kwaliteit	Intensiteit	Kwaliteit	Intensiteit
Rondte 1	HOOG	2	HOOG	3
Rondte 2	HOOG	3	HOOG	0
Rondte 3	HOOG	2	LAAG	0
Rondte 4	HOOG	0	LAAG	0
Rondte 5	HOOG	1	HOOG	7
Rondte 6	HOOG	1	LAAG	3
Rondte 7	HOOG	0	LAAG	3
Rondte 8	HOOG	2	LAAG	1
Rondte 9	HOOG		LAAG	
Rondte 10	HOOG		LAAG	
Rondte 11				
Rondte 12				
Rondte 13				
Rondte 14				


Intensity \ Condition	0	1	2
Good	0	7	8
Bad	0	2	3

B. Vollan

Based on Janssen et al. Project: <http://www.public.asu.edu/~majansse/dor/nsfhsd.htm>




Cooperation for NRM: country differences and introduction of rules



- In Namibia a higher share of the land is maintained in a good condition (42% vs 4% for RSA)
=> Nomadism in the recent past

Vollan & al. in prep.

- The introduction of rules improves rangeland quality, although its efficiency declines slightly over time



Conclusion: towards sustainable management of rangeland

- Any clarification of property rights (rules) improves cooperative management of rangeland resources
- Cultural norms and rules of interaction influence levels of trust. Understanding them and taking them into account is crucial for the success of implementation of rangeland management institutions
Ex: Functioning cooperation norms/customs in Namibia exist => basis for updated management institutions (e.g. co-management scheme)?
- Modeling makes apparent for farmers the impact of their knowledge about rainfall on the efficiency of their management
Reduce uncertainty and reduces degradation risks by:
 - Monitoring of rainfall patterns under climate change
 - Farmers need to be integrated in the analysis of data generated



Gains

- Integration of disciplines and tools: Field experiments and bio-economic modeling
- With time and cooperation, we have built capacities in interdisciplinary communication, created common vocabulary which enables us to carry better holistic research as time goes by

Perspectives

- Jointly consider economic, ecological and social costs of land use options
 - Monitor social capital and cooperation in times of institutional change
 - Deepen the link between biodiversity and ecosystem services by considering biodiversity as an element for socio-ecological resilience
- Ex: Investigate how biodiversity supports diversification of production on farms (complex grassland systems, integrated bio-diversity production systems)



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